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Abstract
Using data on 3,225 actively managed U.S. mutual funds from 1980 to 2006,
we test hypotheses designed to disentangle risk and change as outcomes of
behavioral performance feedback routines. We theorize that managers make
decisions involving risk and decisions involving change under different condi-
tions and motivated by different concerns. Our results show internal social
comparison across units within a firm will motivate risk, whereas external
social comparison across firms will motivate change. When a fund experiences
a performance shortfall relative to internal social comparison, the manager is
likely to make decisions that involve risk because the social and spatial proxim-
ity of internal comparisons trigger individual concern and fear of negative indi-
vidual consequences, such as job loss. In contrast, when a fund experiences a
performance shortfall in comparison with external benchmarks, the manager is
more likely to consider the shortfall an organizational concern and make
changes that do not necessarily involve risk. Although we might assume that
negative performance in comparison with both internal and external bench-
marks would spur risky change, our results indicate that risky change occurs
most often when a decision maker receives unfavorable internal social perfor-
mance feedback and favorable external social performance feedback. By ques-
tioning assumptions about why and when organizational change involves risk,
this study begins to separate change and risk outcomes of the decision-making
process.
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When and how managers make the decision to engage in organizational
change is both theoretically and practically important inasmuch as change (or
the lack thereof) is studied across a diverse set of organizational theories and is
argued to be the source of adaptation, learning, evolution, and inertia (Cyert
and March, 1963; March, 1981; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Tushman and
Rosenkopf, 1992; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Some changes are accompa-
nied by risk, which we define as variation in the distribution of possible out-
comes and uncertainty associated with gains and losses (e.g., Pratt, 1964;
Arrow, 1965; Lindley, 1971; March and Shapira, 1987, 1992). Variability in out-
comes is one of the key elements of risk (Sanders and Hambrick, 2007). For
example, new product innovations may lead to risk for the firm (Greve, 2003a,
2007), whereas other changes might have little bearing on risk because they
involve the imitation of well-established practices and strategies or incremental
and routine adaptations (Ketchen and Palmer, 1999; Massini, Lewin, and
Greve, 2005; Schwab, 2007). For example, switching from one commodity sup-
plier to another in an arm’s-length contract is unlikely to expose firms to signifi-
cant risk. More generally, change—whether or not associated with risk—is
likely to be consequential for organizations because all such decisions may
have performance implications. Scholars debate what types of changes, and
what levels of risk, enhance firm performance (Gavetti, 2012; Winter, 2012),
which is why it is crucial to examine when managers make these different
decisions.
The behavioral theory of the firm theorizes about change decisions and their
antecedents (Cyert and March, 1963), positing that change is driven in part by
the feedback that firms receive from comparisons made either with the firm’s
prior performance or with the performance of others (Greve, 2003c). Simply
put, organizations make changes when they receive unfavorable performance
feedback. Cyert and March’s (1963) seminal propositions about organizational
change were made without any reference to risk per se (Argote and Greve,
2007), yet most subsequent scholarship in this domain has assumed that risk
and change occur together, implying that change is always associated with risk.
For example, risk taking has been assumed in a number of decisions to make
organizational changes, including acquisitions (Iyer and Miller, 2008) and strate-
gic alliances with non-local partners (Baum et al., 2005). As a result, many stud-
ies have suggested that the same conditions give rise to risk and change, with
performance feedback considered a single antecedent of both outcomes.
The integration of risk into these arguments is a result of behavioral scholars
drawing on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), implicitly invoking
this theory’s notion of loss aversion in the domain of failure as a mechanism
that is conceptually equivalent to behavioral theory’s performance feedback
below a set reference point (Singh, 1986; Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 1998). Yet
these seminal theories operate at different levels of analysis—organizational
and individual, respectively (see Shimizu, 2007)—and individual-level determi-
nants of risk are not clearly comparable to organizational-level determinants of
organizational change. This raises questions about whether performance feed-
back results in risk, change, or both. Thus the impact of performance feedback
on risk and the causal processes behind it need to be considered more fully.
Because of the lack of analytic precision in the literature, we relax the
assumption that risk and change necessarily operate in concert and propose
that the two may arise under different conditions and reflect distinct causal
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processes. Change and risk may therefore reflect different concerns: organiza-
tional and individual, respectively. Managers are likely to undertake change
when performance feedback indicates an organizational problem. The focal
mechanism here is problemistic search, which Cyert and March (1963)
described as an organizational response to a performance shortfall. In contrast,
risk is a response to performance feedback indicating an individual concern.
The focal mechanism is one of loss aversion: as described in prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), individuals respond to their aversion to loss by
taking greater risks, so we would expect to find risk as a response to perfor-
mance feedback that triggers individual concerns for the manager. But though
loss aversion is distinct from problemistic search, the two mechanisms may
occur simultaneously. When both organizational and individual concerns are
identified, the two mechanisms are likely to work in concert, resulting in ‘‘risky
organizational change,’’ such as has been seen in the literature (Greve, 1998:
58).
Further, individual and organizational concerns may relate to different
sources of performance feedback. Individual concerns can emanate from a rela-
tively unexamined source of performance feedback: social comparisons made
to units inside the firm, such as when a decision maker compares the unit for
which he or she has responsibility with other units within the firm. Such inter-
nal social performance comparisons are likely to be the primary driver of individ-
ual concerns because they are socially and physically proximate (i.e., Festinger,
1954) and are consequential for determining rewards and termination threat
(i.e., Lazear and Rosen, 1981). By contrast, comparisons with actors external to
the focal organization may indicate organizational problems, because negative
performance relative to an external comparison group indicates poor perfor-
mance relative to competitors or similar organizations in the market.
We take advantage of the numerous empirical benefits of the U.S. mutual
fund industry. In this context, risk can be quantified ex ante by decision makers
and is clearly distinguishable from change. In addition, because mutual fund
performance is closely monitored and publicly disclosed, a fund manager has a
well-defined set of both internal and external funds for social performance
comparison.
CHANGE AND RISK IN THE BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
Cyert and March (1963) advocated a process-oriented view to understand how
events and experiences shape organizational decision making. A central pre-
mise in this perspective is that an organizational performance shortfall triggers
decisions that lead to organizational adaptation (Greve, 2003c). In table 1, we
distinguish between organizational change and risk as the central outcomes
examined in this feedback/adaptation process, also known as performance
feedback theory, using examples from selected studies (for a comprehensive
review, see Shinkle, 2012).
A number of studies have focused on change outcomes and have some-
times confounded those changes with risk either theoretically or empirically
(see the first column in table 1). Many changes analyzed are routine or incre-
mental, often having little or a negative impact on risk levels (e.g., Massini,
Lewin, and Greve, 2005). Other changes have been theorized as either high- or
low-risk changes. For example, some scholars consider R&D intensity to
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indicate uncertain and risky investments (Vissa, Greve, and Chen, 2010; Lim
and McCann, 2014), while others note that R&D may not be risky when those
expenditures are targeted at existing projects (Greve, 2003a). In other
instances, and in the absence of directly measuring risk, scholars have mea-
sured only change but theorized that all such changes are risky (e.g., Baum et
al., 2005; Audia and Greve, 2006; Desai, 2008). For example, Baum et al.
(2005) theorized that forming ties with non-local partners is risky, even though
it is plausible that such ties might reduce uncertainty and variability by bringing
critical new knowledge. We included many studies evoking ‘‘risky change’’ in
the first column of table 1 for ‘‘change’’ because scholars have not directly
measured the risk associated with those changes. Although some of those
changes may indeed be risky, it is not clear that all such changes are risky and
result in increased uncertainty of potential outcomes. For example, an acquisi-
tion of a target when the focal firm already owns a significant stake may not be
a risky decision (Iyer and Miller, 2008). We also omitted from table 1 studies
that do not clearly examine change or risk outcomes, such as those studies
predicting growth or accident costs (Baum and Dahlin, 2007; Greve, 2007; Kim
and Tsai, 2012).
A smaller set of studies, listed in the second column of table 1, has focused
on risk per se, measured as the variance in firm-level outcomes, including secu-
rity analysts’ forecasts (Bromiley, 1991), or in firms’ return on assets (ROA)
(Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). Conceptualized in this way, the decision to take
on greater risk need not be concurrent with the decision to make change; risk
Table 1. Selected Research on Change, Risk, and Risky Change Outcomes
Change Risk Risky change
Acquisition probability Attempting a 4th down conversion Adoption of new innovative radio format
Iyer & Miller, 2008 Lehman & Hahn, 2013 Greve, 1998
Adopting a satellite radio format Financial misrepresentation Launch innovation
Greve, 1998 Harris & Bromiley, 2007 Greve, 2003a
Capacity expansion/investment Size of bet Planned radical vs. incremental change
Audia & Greve, 2006 Boyle & Shapira, 2012 Labianca et al., 2009
Desai, 2008 Variance in analysts’ forecasts
Change in routines Bromiley, 1991
Massini, Lewin, & Greve, 2005 Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996
Change in services Variance in firm ROA
Ketchen & Palmer, 1999 Palmer & Wiseman, 1999
Change in status of network ties Miller & Chen, 2004
Shipilov, Li, & Greve, 2011 Variance in firm ROE
Choice of non-local network ties Gooding, Goel, and Wiseman, 1996
Baum et al., 2005 Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988
Join R&D consortia
Bolton, 1993
New product introduction
Greve, 2007
Gaba & Joseph, 2013
R&D investment
Greve, 2003a
Chen & Miller, 2007
Vissa, Greve, & Chen, 2010
Lim & McCann, 2014
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may increase even in the absence of change. For example, in high-velocity mar-
kets, the failure to make changes might lead to greater risk for the firm (e.g.,
Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). Yet within the subset of studies focusing on risk,
the question of whether risk involves change has been left unaddressed.
Finally, a number of studies, listed in the third column of table 1, have expli-
citly examined risky change, generally by considering multiple change decisions
accompanied by varying levels of risk (i.e., Greve, 1998, 2003a; Labianca et al.,
2009). Greve’s study of changes in radio station formats (1998) offers an excel-
lent demonstration of risky change by clearly articulating levels of risk inherent
in the different change decisions. Similarly, Greve (2003a) separated the deci-
sion to engage in change from the decision to take on risk in the innovation
context: problemistic search increases R&D intensity change (see the first col-
umn in table 1), while managerial propensity to take on risk predicts the deci-
sion to launch product innovations (see the third column in table 1). Despite the
vast literature examining performance feedback, there has been little consis-
tency in distinguishing among risk, change, or risky change outcomes. Risk and
change have been generally assumed to occur simultaneously, and often the
terms are used interchangeably.
Performance Feedback: Organizational and Individual Concerns
Change, risk, and risky change are all outcomes that have been examined
within the behavioral theory tradition, but researchers have not assessed the
possibility that distinct theoretical mechanisms might trigger risk and change.
The seminal theories exploring these two outcomes, behavioral theory and
prospect theory, were developed to explain decision making at different levels
of analysis: behavioral theory at the organizational level and prospect theory at
the individual level. By incorporating prospect theory into behavioral theory,
scholars have assumed that the associations and mechanisms predicted by
prospect theory will occur at both the individual and organizational levels of
analysis. Following multilevel theory (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000), this is an
assumption of isomorphism (Rousseau, 1985). The implicit claim that the
individual-level determinants of risk are isomorphic with organizational-level
determinants of change has not been tested, however, and should not be
assumed a priori. Rather, according to the seminal theories, change is likely to
arise in response to organizational problems, as in behavioral theory, and risk is
likely to arise in response to individual concerns, as in prospect theory.
According to behavioral theory, which is concerned with organizational deci-
sion making, change is conceptualized as any adaptation in organizational rou-
tines and processes (e.g., March, 1981). In this seminal conceptualization,
change is not associated with risk. Change decisions are made when feedback
about organizational performance indicates an organizational problem. Broadly
speaking, performance feedback is evaluated in reference to preset aspirations
(March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963): it derives from assessing
the difference between achieved performance and the aspiration point (Lant,
1992). Past studies have identified two distinct performance aspirations: the
firm’s own prior performance (historical aspirations) and performance of a
meaningful referent group (social aspirations). The general model suggests that
when performance falls short of aspirations derived from either or both histori-
cal and social comparison, organizations engage in ‘‘problemistic search’’ and
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make subsequent change in an attempt to improve their performance (Cyert
and March, 1963: 169). Search is typically ‘‘simpleminded,’’ triggering relatively
simple, short-run, and incremental reactions, with search often taking place in
the neighborhood of the problem (Cyert and March, 1963: 121–122).
Though behavioral theory leverages an organizational argument, subsequent
research suggested that managerial risk taking (Singh, 1986; Bromiley, 1991)
and managerial risk preferences (March and Shapira, 1987, 1992) were also
associated with performance feedback. But in its initial conceptualization, risk
generally arises in response to individual rather than organizational concerns. In
fact, the individual mechanism of loss aversion was developed as a theoretical
component in prospect theory, which posits that alternatives are framed as
either gains or losses relative to a reference point, and individuals are more
sensitive to losses than to commensurate gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001). In a series
of laboratory experiments, Tversky and Kahneman examined alternatives with
pre-assigned gains and losses and observed that individuals were more likely
to take risks when decisions were framed as losses rather than as gains. In the
language of behavioral theory, negative performance feedback can be equated
with a loss. Individual aversion to loss has been further validated in a number
of contexts, ranging from individuals’ decisions on tax evasion (Chang, Nichols,
and Schultz, 1987) to gambling (Kameda and Davis, 1990). These studies col-
lectively imply that risk results from loss aversion when individuals frame a situ-
ation as one in which they are likely to experience significant losses.
Scholars have merged these ideas from prospect theory into behavioral the-
ory and have assumed that the individual-level associations and mechanisms
predicted by prospect theory will occur isomorphically at the organizational level
of analysis. In contrast, we theorize distinct mechanisms at different decision-
making levels and suggest that risk and change are likely to be driven by two
different sources of performance feedback: one that identifies organizational
performance problems and one that identifies individual performance concerns.
Performance Feedback: External and Internal Social Comparisons
The distinction between individual and organizational concerns is particularly
salient in the context of social performance feedback because social compari-
sons can trigger individual concerns when made to referents inside the firm
and organizational concerns when made to referents outside the firm. It has
been well established that social referents external to the firm are the central
source of feedback about organizational problems (Cyert and March, 1963;
Greve, 2003c; but see Mezias, Chen, and Murphy, 2002). Organizational prob-
lems are identified when managers assess organizational performance by mak-
ing comparisons with similar organizations or competitors in the market.
Through these external comparisons, organizational decision makers recognize
the firm’s poor relative position. The external referent group often consists of
all industry incumbents (e.g., Greve, 1998; Miller and Chen, 2004; Audia and
Greve, 2006) or other organizations similar in certain dimensions, including geo-
graphic location or the level of innovation (Greve, 2003a; Massini, Lewin, and
Greve, 2005; Baum and Dahlin, 2007; Moliterno et al., 2014). For example,
Ketchen and Palmer (1999) found that managers changed hospital services and
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technologies in response to poor performance relative to other firms within
their strategic group.
Consistent with this view, a number of studies have documented significant
associations between change and performance relative to external social
aspirations (e.g., Labianca et al., 2009; Shipilov, Li, and Greve, 2011). Other
studies have found no effects of such external social comparisons on risk
(Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996), and still others have found partial or no effects
on change outcomes (here, change and risk have been confounded because
risk has been asserted but not measured; Greve, 2003b; Audia and Greve,
2006; Desai, 2008; Iyer and Miller, 2008; Lim and McCann, 2014). This assess-
ment is further complicated by the fact that many studies have modeled social
and historical aspirations together, making it difficult to determine the relative
importance of social aspirations (e.g., Palmer and Wiseman, 1999; Gaba and
Joseph, 2013). But together, these studies provide some support for the notion
that external performance comparisons are the key driver of change decisions
and cast doubt on the notion that such comparisons may have an effect on risk
decisions.
By contrast, we expect unfavorable performance comparisons relative to
units inside the firm to be a central source of feedback indicating individual con-
cerns (see also Mezias, Chen, and Murphy, 2002; Gaba and Joseph, 2013), for
at least two reasons. First, such comparisons are salient due to the physical
and social proximity of the social referents. The notion that proximity facilitates
the formation of a reference group and that individuals consider socially compa-
rable and physically proximate others as relevant referents has been well estab-
lished by scholars (Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 1950; Festinger, 1954; Burt,
1982; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; Nickerson and Zenger, 2008).
These similar others provide information and identity signals for managers, and
individuals are concerned with comparisons within this group and are moti-
vated to avoid a negative identity (Blanton and Christie, 2003). Further, individ-
ual feelings of deprivation or entitlement are based on social comparisons
across structurally equivalent ‘‘neighbors’’ or ‘‘near peers’’ (Stouffer et al.,
1949; Burt, 1982; Burt, 2010: 256). When unfavorable comparisons are preva-
lent within the firm, for example, a low-productivity worker comparing him- or
herself to a high-productivity worker, relative deprivation is likely triggered, lead-
ing to risky conduct (Stark and Hyll, 2011).
Organizational structures enhance social and physical proximity in multiple
ways. Units and actors within a single firm are often co-located (Alcacer and
Delgado, 2013), and such internal agglomerations enhance individuals’ ability to
make meaningful comparisons across different actors or units. In addition,
firms organized by business unit, division, or market often have directly compa-
rable, unit-specific performance outcomes (e.g., Greve, 1998; Birkinshaw and
Lingblad, 2005; Labianca et al., 2009; Gaba and Joseph, 2013) and use consul-
tants to aid in cross-unit performance comparisons (e.g., KPMG, SAP,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and the Hackett Group). For example, Kaiser
Associates provides expertise in internal benchmarking to facilitate ‘‘apples to
apples’’ comparisons across units (http://www.kaiserassociates.com/capabilities/
benchmarking/benchmarking-services/). More generally, research suggests that
knowledge of relative performance within an organization increases the likeli-
hood of social comparison between workers, as well as the incidence of dis-
reputable behavior (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol, 2011; Charness, Masclet, and
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Villeval, 2014). Finally, forced distribution rating systems are often used in
which supervisors are required to rank employees relative to each other
according to a bell-curve distribution—for example, 10 percent of all employ-
ees are ranked as poor performers. In fact, the spread of winners-take-all
organizations, in which work is allocated by employees’ performance, makes
social comparisons salient (Netessine and Yakubovich, 2012).
Second, unfavorable internal social comparisons are an individual concern
because they are consequential for people’s careers. Multiple organizational
and economic studies of labor markets have concluded that individuals are fun-
damentally concerned about their advancement prospects within a firm (e.g.,
Baron and Bielby, 1980; Barnett, Baron, and Stuart, 2000), with potential for ter-
mination, promotion chances, and rewards being of central importance (e.g.,
Oldham et al., 1986; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). Studies on internal tourna-
ments, for example, have generally linked relative internal performance ranking
to variation in wages, promotions, or division-level resources (Lazear and
Rosen, 1981; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008). Accordingly, these studies have
observed that a performance shortfall relative to others in the firm has often
resulted in job termination or reduction in compensation, leading to significant
losses for individual workers (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Chevalier and
Ellison, 1999; Nyberg, 2010; Hu, Kale, and Pagani, 2011).
In short, internal social performance comparisons are a basis for individual
concerns and lead to loss aversion and risk, while external social performance
comparisons are the basis for organizational problems that lead to problemistic
search and organizational change. Despite this logic, it is worthwhile to con-
sider the alternative relationships. It is unlikely that unfavorable internal social
comparisons will trigger problemistic search and organizational change because
one unit’s poor performance relative to another does not necessarily indicate
an organizational problem. Though problematic for the individual manager of
the poorly performing unit, such underperformance might not be consequential
to the organization. For example, external stakeholders such as stockholders
are likely to evaluate the organization only in reference to other similar organiza-
tions in the marketplace and not in reference to other units in the firm.
Similarly, negative external social comparisons are unlikely to trigger loss
aversion and risk because this type of underperformance does not indicate indi-
vidual concerns. Though such comparisons may have individual consequences
in some markets, such as the market for high-level executives or CEOs (Kulik
and Ambrose, 1992; DiPrete, Eirich, and Pittinsky, 2010), our core arguments
for individual concerns—salience, proximity, and future rewards—are more
often determined by relative performance standing in the firm. And poor inter-
nal performance might result in termination even when performance relative to
the external aspirations is high. For example, in academia, assistant professors
underperforming relative to their own department face a termination threat
even if they are outperforming peers at other universities.
Together, these arguments suggest that unfavorable external social perfor-
mance comparisons lead to change outcomes; by contrast, unfavorable internal
social performance comparisons lead to risk outcomes. This argument further
suggests that risky changes should arise when problemistic search and loss
aversion operate jointly, as illustrated by the right-hand column in table 1, and
managers perceive both individual and organizational concerns. Hence we
expect that decisions to engage in risky change are a function of both external
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social performance feedback and internal social performance feedback. We
thus derive the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1):When performance relative to external social aspirations
increases, decision makers will make less change.
Hypothesis 2 (H2):When performance relative to internal social aspirations
increases, decision makers will take less risk.
Hypothesis 3 (H3):When performance relative to internal and external social aspira-
tions increases, decision makers will make less risky change.
METHODS
Empirical Context and Data
Our limited understanding of the conditions under which decision makers focus
on change versus risk might reflect, in part, methodological challenges.
Separating risk and change is difficult because in many contexts decision mak-
ers cannot estimate risk ex ante. We take advantage of a context in which it is
possible to separate risk and change: the mutual fund industry, which is com-
posed of professionally managed collective investments that pool money from
multiple investors and invest in securities such as stocks or bonds. In this set-
ting, financial risk can be measured with precision because standard estima-
tions of risk are widely known. Fund managers, charged with buying and
selling securities, are able to estimate risk prior to deciding which stocks or
bonds to buy or sell.
Moreover, mutual funds offer a rare opportunity to model internal and exter-
nal social performance comparisons, which are otherwise difficult to observe.
Asset management firms often include multiple business units or funds (Drazin
and Rao, 1999; Kacperczyk, 2012, 2013) that are bound together by a brand
name, shared distribution channels, research, and common traditions (e.g.,
Fidelity, Vanguard, American Funds, T. Rowe Price, and Janus). Funds have
directly comparable performance, a distinct competitive strategy, a governance
structure, and a legal identity through registration with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Scholars have shown that fund managers routi-
nely benchmark their returns against the returns of other funds (e.g., Jain and
Wu, 2000; Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks, 2006; Gaspar, Massa, and Matos,
2006; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008).
We conducted semi-structured interviews with fund managers and found
that social performance comparisons were salient. One manager stated, ‘‘The
top management decides about promotions, advertising, and compensation. If
you want a higher salary or more resources for your fund, you need to be bet-
ter than others in the firm.’’ Numerous managers suggested that underperfor-
mance relative to others in the firm triggered the threat of termination (see also
Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Hu, Kale, and Pagani, 2011). One manager noted,
‘‘It’s a cut-throat competition. You are evaluated based on how well your fund
did. It matters how well others in your firm did, too. You are always being com-
pared with peers in your firm. If you are at the bottom, then you better prepare
to move.’’ Finally, a number of managers indicated that internal social compari-
sons were more salient and more consequential for careers than external social
comparisons. One manager suggested, ‘‘Even if your fund did fine in the
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market, you may still be worried that [the executives] will be inclined to termi-
nate you or take away your bonus if others in the firm did better.’’ Another fund
manager mentioned, ‘‘You constantly watch how well you do in the market.
But what really matters is whether you are better or worse than other guys in
the firm. That’s what makes the difference.’’
We obtained data on mutual funds from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) Survivorship-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database on all live and
defunct funds in the United States. This database provides rich monthly infor-
mation on mutual funds, including equity, bond, money market, and interna-
tional funds. Moreover, we obtained data on U.S. holdings by merging the
CRSP database with the stockholdings database published by CDA
Investments Technologies, which provides stockholdings of U.S. mutual funds
and is collected both from reports filed by mutual funds with the SEC and from
voluntary reports generated by the funds. We linked each reported stockhold-
ing to the CRSP stock database. The vast majority of funds have holdings of
companies listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX stock exchanges. We elimi-
nated balanced, bond, index, international, and sector funds and concentrated
our analysis on actively managed diversified equity funds because equity fund
managers are most likely to make strategic decisions regarding their invest-
ment styles. Finally, given our focus on internal social performance compari-
sons, we excluded single-fund firms from our sample. Our final sample
comprised 3,225 actively managed diversified equity funds that spanned the
period between 1980 and 2006.
Dependent Variables
Change measures. We considered three measures of change: fund turn-
over, concentration change, and load change. We measured fund turnover as
the frequency with which funds trade their stocks, indicating the percentage of
a fund’s holdings that have changed over the past year, bought and sold by the
manager. Because managers trade stocks with different risk, turnover may
reflect changes associated with higher, lower, or constant risk levels. In gen-
eral, managers trade low-risk stocks at a higher frequency than high-risk stocks
(e.g., Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers, 2000). Correlations of fund turnover and
risk were not statistically significant, suggesting that increases in fund turnover
are unlikely to reflect risk. Fund turnover was derived from the CRSP database
and calculated annually as a ratio of the fund’s total sales or purchases (exclud-
ing cash) and the fund’s average monthly assets during the year, with higher
values indicating greater change to a fund’s portfolio. The CRSP measure was
logged to eliminate outliers, and the independent variables were lagged by one
year to mitigate simultaneity problems.
Concentration change. To measure changes in stock concentration, we
computed the Herfindahl Index of security concentration, following the metho-
dology used by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005). The Herfindahl Index of a
fund’s stock portfolio at time t is defined as the sum of the squared weights of
each stock i in the fund’s portfolio. The index equals 100 if a fund owns only
one common stock, and an equally weighted portfolio of N securities has a
Herfindahl Index of 1/N. To the extent that increasing concentration may indi-
cate risk, we considered concentration increases and decreases by calculating
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an absolute value of those changes. A three-month window was used to com-
pute such changes. The final measure was not positively correlated with risk.
Load change. Finally, we considered absolute changes in a fund’s sales
fees. Fund managers decide about a fund’s expense structures, sales commis-
sions, and dollar investment levels (Santini and Aber, 1993), often altering a
fund’s cost in response to competitive pressures. For example, BlackRock, the
biggest provider of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in the United States, decided
to reduce fees and commissions on its iShares ETFs as a response to the rival
Vanguard Group, ‘‘whose low-cost ETFs have eaten into BlackRock’s market
share’’ (Grind, 2012: C1). We focused on sales loads, primary one-time fees
paid directly by investors. Because the SEC does not limit the sales load
charged by the fund, managers hold considerable discretion over setting the
load percentage. We considered the absolute value of fund-load changes
(increases and decreases), using a three-month window to compute the
changes. The final measure was not significantly correlated with risk.
Risk measures. We measured risk by focusing on fund returns, the most
common financial-risk measures (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; Koski
and Pontiff, 1999; Hu, Kale, and Pagani, 2011). We considered three standard
measures: systematic risk, or uncertainty associated with the entire market
movement; non-systematic risk, or uncertainty associated with a specific asset
or the firm; and total risk, or the sum of systematic and non-systematic risk.
Systematic risk. Systematic risk indicates uncertainty associated with the
entire market or economy and is generally measured with market beta, a stan-
dard indicator of a fund’s portfolio systematic risk in relation to the market (e.g.,
Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976; Mankiw and Shapiro, 1986). Though beta cap-
tures return variability, it is calculated relative to the market benchmark: it takes
into account market volatility and reflects the tendency of a security’s returns to
respond to swings in the market. A beta of 1 indicates that the security’s price
will move with the market, a beta of less than 1 indicates that the security will
be less volatile than the market, and a beta greater than 1 indicates that the
security’s price will be more volatile than the market. Within their equity hold-
ings, managers can shift risk by switching between low-beta stocks and high-
beta stocks. We derived beta by estimating the linear regression of the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965); we used time
series of returns on a given fund and the returns on the market portfolio, typi-
cally represented by the return on the S&P 500 (Carhart, 1997). We estimated
these regressions using rolling windows of the past 12 months of data. We cal-
culated changes in market beta over a moving three-month window.
Non-systematic risk. Non-systematic risk represents financial risk specific to
individual securities held in the fund portfolio and not correlated with the overall
market risk (e.g., Campbell et al., 2001). We measured non-systematic risk as
the standard deviation of return residuals from the market regression we used
to estimate market beta. We estimated the regressions using rolling windows
of the past 12 months of data. We used three-month time spans to account for
changes in the standard deviation of residuals.
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Total risk. We used monthly volatility of historical fund returns, a standard
measure, to measure total risk. Fund volatility is the standard deviation of
returns calculated over the 12 months preceding a given month, and higher val-
ues indicate greater total risk of the fund’s portfolio (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and
Starks, 1996; Koski and Pontiff, 1999; Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2003; Hu, Kale,
and Pagani, 2011). Because returns may reflect the overall market volatility, we
calculated risk-adjusted returns by taking the difference between the fund’s
return and market return, the latter represented by the return on the S&P 500.
Finally, we calculated changes in the standard deviation of risk-adjusted returns
in three-month time spans to reflect the fact that the SEC discloses information
about fund performance and portfolio investment on a quarterly basis. To test
the robustness of this time span, we modeled six-month time spans for all
analyses and found similar results (available from the authors upon request).
Risky change measures. Finally, we considered risky change, defined as
the types of decisions that involve change in stock composition and concurrent
risk taking. To do this, we leveraged data on mutual fund holdings, following
prior research on fund managers’ intended changes in stock composition (e.g.,
Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele, 2009). We considered
shifts from higher to lower book-to-market ratio as well as from larger-cap to
smaller-cap stocks. Stocks with low book-to-market ratios (i.e., growth stocks)
are generally more risky than those with higher book-to-market ratios because
they have a high expectation of future growth and reveal a higher positive cor-
relation with market beta (Harris and Marston, 1994). Similarly, small-cap
stocks have been associated with higher risk than large-cap stocks (Banz,
1981; Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele, 2009).
We followed the methodology in past research (Daniel et al., 1997) to mea-
sure shifts in portfolio composition from high to low book-to-market ratio
stocks and from large-cap to small-cap stocks. We grouped each stock listed
on the U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) into respective
quintiles according to its size and book-to-market ratio. For both measures,
depending on the quintile to which a stock belongs, the stock received a score
between 1 and 5. For size, stocks with the highest market capitalization (i.e.,
those in the top quintile) received a score of 1, and stocks with the lowest mar-
ket capitalization (i.e., those in the bottom quintile) received a score of 5. For
growth, stocks with the highest book-to-market ratio (i.e., those in the top quin-
tile) received a score of 1, and stocks with the lowest book-to-market ratio (i.e.,
those in the bottom quintile) received a score of 5. We calculated changes to
the average portfolio stock size and stock growth quintiles over a moving
three-month window. Overall, higher values of our measures indicate greater
amounts of risky change taken by fund managers.
Explanatory and Control Variables
Internal social performance feedback. To measure internal social perfor-
mance feedback, we calculated the difference between the fund’s achieved
risk-adjusted performance and an internal social performance aspiration, which
we constructed based on the risk-adjusted performance of other funds inside
the firm and within the same fund category. Fund categories represent broad
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classifications of funds’ investment styles and objectives. Because fund returns
may partly be driven by fund investment category, with some categories associ-
ated with more risk than others, any two funds are comparable only within the
same category. We constructed categories using the Morningstar fund classifica-
tion scheme based on fund size (small cap, mid cap, or large cap) and the invest-
ment type (growth or value funds). For example, the performance of a T. Rowe
Price mid-cap growth fund is benchmarked against the performance of other
mid-cap growth funds within T. Rowe Price. We set the performance aspiration
to the mean monthly risk-adjusted performance of the internal reference group
of funds. Hence the internal social aspiration was measured as (S Pjt)/N, where
P indicates fund risk-adjusted returns, j indicates another fund within the firm in
the same category, and N is the total number of such funds in the internal refer-
ence group. We modeled internal social performance feedback as a single con-
tinuous variable, defined as the fund’s risk-adjusted returns minus the relevant
social performance aspiration. We lagged the measure by four months to allevi-
ate simultaneity with the three-month window used for the dependent variables.
To test the robustness of this lag, we also modeled internal performance aspira-
tions as the mean fund performance in the six months and twelve months prior
to the measurement of the dependent variable. We found similar results with
these alternate specifications.
External social performance feedback. We measured external social perfor-
mance feedback as the difference between a fund’s achieved risk-adjusted per-
formance and the external social performance aspiration, which is based on the
risk-adjusted performance of other funds outside the firm and within the same
fund category. For example, the performance of a T. Rowe Price large-cap
value fund is compared with the performance of large-cap value funds in the
United States housed in firms other than T. Rowe Price. The aspiration was set
to the mean risk-adjusted returns of the external referent group. Hence the
external social performance aspiration was measured as (Pkt)/N where k is
another fund in the external referent group and N is the total number of funds
in that referent group. We modeled external social performance feedback as a
single continuous variable, defined as the value of a fund’s risk-adjusted returns
minus its external social aspiration. To alleviate simultaneity, we lagged the
measure by four months.
Control Variables
Historical performance feedback. We controlled for performance relative to
historical aspirations, shown to be a significant source of performance feedback
(e.g., Greve, 2003c). We specified the historical aspiration level for a fund’s per-
formance as an exponentially weighted moving average of its past performance
(Levinthal and March, 1981; Lant, 1992), with performance measured as a
fund’s risk-adjusted return. Thus we constructed the following measure:
Historical Aspirationit = αPit1+ 1 αð ÞAit1
where P is risk-adjusted return, i is the focal fund, t is the time period, and α is
a weighting coefficient indicating the rate at which the historical aspiration vari-
able updates as a function of past performance. At high values of α, the
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aspiration level is sensitive to recent performance. In the models we report
below, we used the specification of historical aspirations with α = 0.25 and
conducted robustness checks for additional values.1 To measure historical per-
formance feedback, we then subtracted the value derived for the aspiration
level at time t from performance at time t and lagged the variable by four
months. The resulting value is positive if a fund’s current period performance is
above the historical aspiration point and negative if it is below.
Other controls. We controlled for numerous fund characteristics. Because
risk decreases with a fund’s size and age (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997), we con-
trolled for both. We measured fund age as a natural logarithm of the number of
years since the fund’s inception and fund size as a natural logarithm of assets
under fund management. We also controlled for fund flow by calculating the net
of the fund’s cash inflows and outflows on a monthly basis. Net inflows gener-
ate excess cash for managers to invest, increasing the probability of change.
We controlled for the number of managers supervising each fund, because solo
managers are likely to have more discretion to make changes to the fund.
We also controlled for firm-level attributes (e.g., Vanguard, T. Rowe Price,
etc.), such as size and performance. We measured firm size as the aggregate
assets of all individual funds within a firm. Firm performance was measured as
the average return of the firm’s funds in any given month using a value-
weighted approach, which multiplies each fund’s risk-adjusted return by its
relative size in the investment firm and takes the sum across all weighted fund
returns in the firm. All control variables were lagged by four months to alleviate
simultaneity problems with the dependent variables.
Model Specification
We first estimated the linear regression models of change and risk. Because
the two are likely to overlap, estimating separate equations might lead to ineffi-
cient estimates of the coefficients and standard errors, with disturbances con-
temporaneously correlated across equations. To alleviate this concern, we
estimated those models simultaneously using seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR) (Zellner, 1962), an empirical technique that estimates error covariances
among the estimated equations and results in more efficient estimates of the
coefficients and standard errors (Zellner, 1962; Parker and Dolich, 1986). Given
our goal to assess the predictors of risk and change, we jointly estimated three
pairs of equations, with risk and change as dependent variables in each pair.2
Subsequently, we assessed the predictors of risky change by estimating a
series of linear regression models with risky change as the dependent variable.
We implemented a highly conservative analytical strategy to account for dif-
ferent sources of unobserved heterogeneity. The models were estimated with
month-fixed effects to control for exogenous shifts in the opportunity structure.
1 Consistent with past research, we estimated our models with calculated values of the historical
aspiration point constructed using values of α = 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 and selected the model with
the best overall fit. The coefficient results were robust to the other two specifications of α.
2 For robustness, we reestimated jointly all equations, as well as different combinations of depen-
dent variables, and obtained similar results. In addition, we estimated models in which we con-
trolled for total risk in the models predicting change and controlled for change in the models
predicting risk. Our results (available upon request) are robust to this alternative specification.
Kacperczyk, Beckman, and Moliterno 241
We augmented our specification with a fund-category-fixed estimator to allevi-
ate the possibility that our results may be contaminated by unobserved attri-
butes of fund categories. An important concern might be that fund categories
with systematically higher tolerance for risk (e.g., small-cap growth funds) may
encourage risk taking. Finally, we focused on fund-month as the unit of analysis
and clustered error terms by the fund.
RESULTS
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the main variables.
Table 3 presents the results for risk and change estimated with the SUR
method. These results test our first two hypotheses. First, when we accounted
for external social performance feedback alone, as is typical in the literature,
our findings provided support for hypothesis 1: negative external social perfor-
mance feedback leads to greater change, and the results are robust across all
change measures (i.e., models 2, 6, and 10). We reestimated the same models
with internal social performance feedback, and the results in table 3 report sta-
tistically insignificant coefficients of internal social performance feedback in the
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Analysis of Social Performance Feedback, Risk, and
Change, 1980–2006*
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Total risk (volatility) .001 .014
2. Systematic risk (market beta) .001 .002 .871
3. Non-systematic risk .000 1.335 .277 −.024
4. Fund turnover (log) −.464 .955 −.001 .000 .000
5. Concentration change (abs.) 2.349 3.648 −.004 −.007 .003 −.045
6. Load change (abs.) .049 .058 −.001 −.002 −.001 −.011 −.023
7. Risky change (stock growth) .000 .464 .050 .045 .003 .000 −.003 .000
8. Risky change (stock size) .000 .215 .008 .006 .001 .000 .008 −.001 .142
9. External performance feedback .000 .025 .016 .008 .009 .006 .001 −.005 .004 −.016
10. Internal performance feedback .008 .055 .020 .007 .020 .010 .004 .002 .002 −.014
11. Historical performance feedback .000 .022 .014 .005 .016 .002 −.014 .003 .016 −.022
12. Fund age (log) 2.221 .900 .002 .001 .000 −.102 .014 .042 .001 .000
13. Fund size (log) 5.296 1.741 −.001 .000 −.002 −.093 −.146 .069 .000 .000
14. Fund flow .012 .192 −.007 −.003 −.009 .011 −.013 .005 .000 .001
15. Number of managers per fund 1.627 .934 .000 .000 .000 .069 −.135 .088 .000 .000
16. Firm size .571 .519 −.016 −.003 −.008 −.016 −.014 −.011 .000 −.015
17. Firm performance −.001 .012 .000 .000 .001 .012 −.037 −.009 .008 .001
Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
10. Internal performance feedback .643
11. Historical performance feedback .449 .327
12. Fund age (log) −.002 −.010 −.001
13. Fund size (log) .011 −.005 −.006 .475
14. Fund flow .023 .023 −.021 −.079 −.007
15. Number of managers per fund −.002 .000 .002 −.040 .266 .003
16. Firm size .209 .000 .364 −.004 .001 −.004 −.007
17. Firm performance −.002 −.003 −.001 .046 .113 −.003 −.005 −.006
* Correlation coefficients greater than .005 are significant at the 5-percent level.
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Table 3. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions of Social Performance Feedback, Risk, and Change*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable
Total
risk
Fund
turnover
Total
risk
Fund
turnover
Non-systematic
risk
Load
change
Historical performance
feedback
−0.555•• 0.362•• −0.301• 0.368•• −0.463•• −0.028••
(0.126) (0.123) (0.129) (0.123) (0.147) (0.007)
Fund age −0.045 −4.165•• −0.052 −4.164•• −0.330• 0.038••
(0.295) (0.312) (0.294) (0.312) (0.159) (0.008)
Fund size 0.017 −4.367•• 0.015 −4.368•• −0.078 0.159••
(0.156) (0.165) (0.156) (0.165) (0.393) (0.018)
Fund flows −0.216 −0.813 0.003 −0.799 −0.012 0.088••
(1.257) (1.331) (1.257) (1.331) (0.206) (0.010)
Firm size 0.001 0.162•• 0.001 0.162•• 1.125 0.160•
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (1.605) (0.075)
Firm performance −0.028 −0.012•• −0.816•• −0.012•• 0.001 0.008••
(0.223) (0.004) (0.236) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000)
Number of managers
per fund
−0.000 0.020•• −0.000 0.020•• −0.004 −0.061••
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.014)
External performance
feedback
−0.808•• −0.692•• 0.034 −0.632•• 0.001 −0.001••
(0.108) (0.114) (0.136) (0.138) (0.003) (0.000)
Internal performance
feedback
– – −0.998•• −0.075 – –
– – (0.098) (0.098) – –
Observations 159,576 159,576 159,576 159,576 188,812 188,812
R-squared 0.644 0.076 0.644 0.076 0.140 0.026
Log likelihood −407703 −407703 −407652 −407652 −36921 −36921
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variable
Non-systematic
risk
Load
change
Systematic
risk
Concentration
change
Systematic
risk
Concentration
change
Historical performance
feedback
0.246 −0.036•• −0.066•• 0.184 −0.057•• 0.075
(0.179) (0.009) (0.013) (0.351) (0.013) (0.358)
Fund age −0.259 0.036•• 0.001 9.597•• 0.001 9.601••
(0.159) (0.008) (0.030) (0.796) (0.030) (0.796)
Fund size −0.071 0.159•• 0.002 −19.324•• 0.002 −19.323••
(0.393) (0.018) (0.016) (0.419) (0.016) (0.419)
Fund flows −0.023 0.088•• 0.086 −1.191 0.093 −1.267
(0.206) (0.010) (0.123) (3.265) (0.123) (3.265)
Firm size 1.254 0.158• 0.000 −0.456•• 0.000 −0.456••
(1.604) (0.075) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.012)
Firm performance 0.001 0.008•• 0.087•• 2.239•• 0.060• 2.574••
(0.006) (0.000) (0.023) (0.617) (0.025) (0.654)
Number of managers
per fund
−0.004 −0.053•• −0.000 −0.041•• −0.000 −0.041••
(0.006) (0.015) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006)
External performance
feedback
0.001 −0.001•• −0.004 −1.210•• 0.026 −1.567••
(0.003) (0.000) (0.011) (0.301) (0.014) (0.380)
Internal performance
feedback
−0.891•• 0.009 – – −0.035•• 0.425
(0.128) (0.006) – – (0.010) (0.277)
Observations 188,812 188,812 189,607 189,607 189,607 189,607
R-squared 0.140 0.026 0.643 0.218 0.643 0.218
Log likelihood −36896 −36896 −266494 −266494 −266487 −266487
•
p < .05; ••p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include month and category fixed effects.
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models of change.3 As shown in models 4, 8, and 12, the results are similar,
indicating that external social performance feedback is a significant driver of
change, even when controlling for internal social performance feedback.
Together, these results indicate that managers tend to engage in change in
response to performance shortfalls relative to external social referents.
Second, the results shed light on the influence of internal social performance
feedback on risk. Lending support to hypothesis 2, the analyses reported in
models 3, 7, and 11 show that an increase in performance relative to internal
social performance aspiration reduces risk, as indicated by the negative coeffi-
cient of internal social performance feedback.4 As reported in models 1, 5, and
9, external social performance feedback is negatively associated with total risk
but has no significant association with systematic and non-systematic risk. As
shown in model 3, however, the coefficient of external social performance
feedback is no longer significant when controlling for internal social perfor-
mance feedback. Overall, these findings suggest that although a shortfall in
external social performance feedback leads to greater change, a shortfall in
internal social performance feedback leads to greater risk.
Table 3 reports further on the impact of fund-level characteristics on risk and
change. Historical performance feedback is negatively associated with all mea-
sures of risk and one measure of change, fund load. Surprisingly, historical per-
formance feedback has a positive association with stock turnover, suggesting
that the amount of change increases as performance relative to the prior per-
formance period improves. In addition, fund size is negatively correlated with
turnover and change in stock concentration, but it has a positive association
with changes in load. Fund age has a significant positive association with stock
concentration and fund load, and it has a significant negative association with
fund turnover. Fund flow has a positive impact on fund load. Firm size and per-
formance are significantly correlated with all measures of change, and firm per-
formance additionally predicts systematic risk. Finally, the number of managers
per fund has a significant association with all change outcomes but no impact
on risk.
Table 4 shows estimates for the effects of internal and external social perfor-
mance feedback on risky change for two measures of risky change. Models 1
and 2 estimate the effects of internal and external social performance feedback
on risky change, and models 3 and 4 add an interaction term to test whether
these sources of performance feedback are complements or substitutes. The
main effect of internal social performance feedback is significant in models of
stock size change (to smaller stocks) and stock growth change (to lower book-
to-market ratio). The results for external social performance feedback are
mixed: it is a significant predictor of change in stock growth but not in stock
size. We thus find that a shortfall in internal social performance feedback is the
most important source of feedback predicting risky change. This might suggest
that the loss aversion mechanism dominates the problem search mechanism
3 In additional analyses, we entered internal social performance feedback into the change models
without external social performance feedback. The results (available upon request) show a signifi-
cant and negative coefficient for internal social performance feedback when predicting turnover
(p < .01) but an insignificant coefficient for the remaining measures of change.
4 In additional analyses, we entered internal social performance feedback into the risk models with-
out external social performance feedback. The results (available upon request) confirm a significant
negative relationship with risk across all the risk-dependent variables.
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for risky change outcomes. Moreover, the interaction between internal and
external social performance feedback is negative and significant. The associa-
tion between internal social performance feedback and risky change becomes
stronger as external social performance feedback improves. Although this is
generally consistent with hypothesis 3, graphing the interaction terms reveals
that the predicted amount of risky change is highest with negative internal
social performance feedback and positive external social performance feed-
back. Thus hypothesis 3 holds only when both sources of performance feed-
back are high, suggesting a more complex theoretical argument than we
hypothesized.
Supplemental Analyses
Examining individual concerns. We conducted supplemental analyses to
probe the causal processes behind these observed relationships and test the
robustness of our results. We interacted social performance feedback with vari-
ables consistent with our hypothesized mechanisms. These estimates test for
the heterogeneous effects of social performance feedback on risk and change
depending on spatial and social proximity and on career concerns. We first con-
sidered the proximity of same-firm funds and expected the influence of internal
Table 4. OLS Regressions of Social Performance Feedback and Risky Change*
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock size
change
Stock growth
change
Stock size
change
Stock growth
change
Historical performance feedback 0.107•• 0.022 0.107•• 0.021
(0.036) (0.069) (0.029) (0.069)
Fund age 0.004 0.014 0.001 0.005
(0.012) (0.024) (0.063) (0.025)
Fund size 0.010 −0.006 0.008 −0.010
(0.005) (0.011) (0.033) (0.011)
Fund flows 0.169 0.594 0.178 0.616
(0.372) (0.573) (0.251) (0.578)
Firm size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Firm performance −0.054 −0.013 −0.054 −0.014
(0.063) (0.122) (0.053) (0.122)
Number of managers per fund −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
External performance feedback −0.008 −0.166• −0.006 −0.161•
(0.032) (0.072) (0.030) (0.072)
Internal performance feedback −0.047• −0.171•• −0.048• −0.173••
(0.023) (0.048) (0.022) (0.048)
Internal performance feedback × External performance feedback – – −0.980• −2.279•
– – (0.416) (1.121)
Observations 193,615 193,615 193,615 193,615
R-squared 0.097 0.054 0.097 0.054
Log likelihood 33912 −119731 33915 −119728
•
p < .05; ••p < .01.
* Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include month and category fixed effects.
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social comparisons on risk to be stronger for similar funds hosted within a sin-
gle firm. We focused on similarity in funds’ reported investment objectives and
calculated an annual proportion of same-firm funds that share investment
objectives with the focal fund. For fund categorization, we relied on a fine-
grained investment objective classification developed by CRSP, which includes
23 investment categories. Second, we examined the spatial proximity of
same-firm funds. If spatial proximity highlights individual concerns, the impact
of internal social comparisons on risk should be stronger when funds in a single
firm are also geographically co-located. We used the CRSP data on funds’ loca-
tions, and for each focal fund we calculated an annual proportion of same-firm
funds co-located in the same city as the focal fund. Finally, we considered
career concerns and expected the relation between internal performance feed-
back and risk to be stronger when career concerns are likely to be salient. We
used recessionary periods to proxy for career concerns: underperforming man-
agers are more likely to lose their jobs and fewer new funds are started during
recessions (Zhao, 2005), making it more difficult for a terminated fund manager
to find a new job. We used the definition of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) business cycle dating committee and operationalized reces-
sion as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the economy in month t was in reces-
sion, as defined by the NBER, and 0 otherwise. During our sample period,
there were 39 recessionary periods.
The SUR estimates reported in table 5 provide general support for the theo-
rized individual mechanisms. First, the association of negative internal perfor-
mance feedback and risk is stronger when a focal fund is more proximate to
other funds in the firm in that it shares the same investment objective with a
higher proportion of other funds in the firm (for two of the risk-dependent vari-
ables, in model 1 and model 3) and is co-located with a higher proportion of
other funds in the firm (for two of the risk-dependent variables, model 1 and
model 5). Similarly, risk increases with negative internal performance feedback
during recessionary periods for all three risk-dependent variables, as indicated
by the negative interaction between recession and internal performance feed-
back. Additional findings merit attention. The results generally show a weaker
association of these moderators and the negative effect of external social per-
formance feedback on change. The interaction terms in the change models are
mostly insignificant, with two exceptions (model 2 and model 4). The general
lack of statistical significance is consistent with the claim that the negative
impact of external social performance feedback on change is not driven by indi-
vidual concerns. This provides additional evidence that the influence of internal
and external social performance feedback is unlikely to reflect the same
mechanisms. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that decision
makers take greater risk as they underperform relative to internal social perfor-
mance aspirations, which are salient because of social and spatial proximity as
well as career concerns.
Selection effects. One inferential challenge pertains to the fact that individ-
uals with traits correlated with propensity for risk may sort differentially across
funds, self-selecting into funds that perform lower relative to internal social
aspirations. Although there is no direct evidence to support the notion that the
managerial traits that predict propensity to undertake risk should also be
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responsible for differential sorting of managers across funds, such self-
selection is conceivable. Sorting processes could spuriously generate an asso-
ciation between internal social performance feedback and the propensity to
take on risk.
To rule out this explanation, our identification strategy exploited changes in
fund performance relative to the internal social aspirations that arise
Table 5. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions of Social Performance Feedback, Risk, and Change
(Interaction Effects)*
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total
risk
Fund
turnover
Non-systematic
risk
Load
change
Systematic
risk
Concentration
change
Historical performance feedback −0.140 0.416•• −0.181 0.032•• −0.051•• 0.683•
(0.131) (0.125) (0.162) (0.008) (0.014) (0.328)
Fund age −0.063 −3.712•• −0.058 0.193•• 0.003 9.723••
(0.298) (0.316) (0.401) (0.019) (0.031) (0.810)
Fund size 0.008 −4.973•• −0.038 0.100•• 0.002 −17.019••
(0.163) (0.173) (0.217) (0.010) (0.017) (0.440)
Fund flows 0.644 −2.099 1.222 0.213•• 0.201 −0.060
(1.320) (1.400) (1.681) (0.079) (0.129) (3.411)
Firm size 0.004 0.038•• −0.000 0.009•• 0.000 −0.673••
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.019)
Firm performance −0.795•• −0.013•• −0.000 −0.053•• 0.058• 0.020
(0.238) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.025) (0.013)
Number of managers per fund −0.000 0.018•• 0.001 −0.001•• −0.000 −0.045••
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
External performance feedback 0.109 −0.595•• 0.243 0.007 0.027 −0.321
(0.139) (0.210) (0.183) (0.013) (0.015) (0.551)
Internal performance feedback −0.621•• −0.108 −0.414• 0.009 −0.050•• 0.091
(0.140) (0.099) (0.190) (0.006) (0.015) (0.262)
Fund similarity −0.001 0.043•• 0.000 −0.000•• −0.000 0.042••
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
Recession 2.935•• 0.040 0.012 0.011 0.104•• 3.315••
(0.156) (0.165) (0.199) (0.009) (0.015) (0.401)
Spatial proximity −0.000 −0.003•• −0.000 0.000•• 0.000 0.005••
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Internal performance feedback ×
Fund similarity
−0.116•• – −0.127•• – 0.002 –
(0.032) – (0.043) – (0.003) –
Internal performance feedback ×
Proximity
−0.029•• – −0.008 – −0.003•• –
(0.007) – (0.009) – (0.001) –
Internal performance feedback ×
Recession
−2.805•• – −1.187•• – −0.108•• –
(0.234) – (0.320) – (0.024) –
External performance feedback ×
Fund similarity
– 0.014 – −0.010•• – −0.125
– (0.043) – (0.003) – (0.114)
External performance feedback ×
Proximity
– 0.010 – −0.000 – −0.040
– (0.010) – (0.001) – (0.024)
External performance feedback ×
Recession
– −1.469•• – −0.021 – −0.145
– (0.326) – (0.019) – (0.846)
Observations 155,167 155,167 183,026 183,026 183,724 183,724
R-squared 0.644 0.082 0.142 0.028 0.642 0.213
Log likelihood −394879 −394879 −34769 −34769 −255916 −255916
•
p < .05; ••p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include month and category fixed effects.
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exogenously to managers’ risk preferences. We took advantage of mutual fund
firms’ mergers and used them as a quasi-natural experiment. Mergers are rela-
tively exogenous to unobserved individual traits that might be potentially corre-
lated with selection into a fund and the decision to take on risk. Moreover, a
merger between two firms represents a change in internal social performance
feedback. Using the CRSP data from 1980 to 2006, we identified 206 mergers
of mutual fund firms that affected 102 firms as bidders. We constructed an
indicator variable equal to 1 for the period a firm is post-merger and 0 for the
period a firm is pre-merger. We used a six-month event window that includes
three months before the merger and three months after the merger. The
advantage of this analytical approach is that it helps examine changes in fund
performance relative to internal social aspirations between treatment firms,
which are affected by the merger, and control firms, which are unaffected by
the merger.
We used the difference-in-differences (DID) methodology, a highly conserva-
tive approach that divides the sample of firms into treatment and control
groups. A simplified analysis would involve examining the amounts of risk
taken before and after the merger to isolate the effect of mergers on risk, but
an important concern with this approach is that the observed correlation
between merger events and risk may be driven by an unobserved time trend.
For example, suppose we wished to estimate the effect of mergers that
occurred in 1989 on risk in the firms affected by these mergers. We would sub-
tract the amount of risk after 1989 from the amount before 1989 for firms
affected by mergers. But other forces in 1989, such as recession, may have
affected the merged firms, leading to higher levels of the outcome variables,
making it difficult to identify whether the amount of risk is increased due to a
time trend or due to mergers. Although this concern is somewhat mitigated
because mergers are staggered over time, this does not eliminate the possibil-
ity that the amount of risk may still change over time due to non-merger-
induced events.
The DID method alleviates this concern by allowing us to choose a control
sample of firms that did not experience mergers but would potentially be sub-
ject to the same time trends. Using the control sample as a benchmark differ-
entiates any non-merger-related trends from the data. Operationally, we
captured the effect of strategic change due to a merger by estimating the fol-
lowing model:
Ci = u+ β1Mergeri + β2Treatmenti + β3Mergeri × Treatmenti + β4Controls+ εi
where C is the outcome variable that may be subject to merger, Merger is an
indicator variable equal to 1 for observations three months after the merger
and 0 for three months before the event, Treatment is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the fund company i was affected by the merger and 0 to indicate
firms in the control group, and Controls is a vector of fund-specific covariates
affecting the outcome variable C. In this specification, the coefficient of primary
interest is the interaction of Merger and Treatment, which captures the differ-
ential effect of the two types of firms around mergers.
Our estimation strategy included two stages. In the first stage, we esti-
mated a DID model to verify that firms affected by mergers did experience
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change in internal social performance feedback relative to firms unaffected by
mergers. A positive and significant coefficient of Merger× Treatment indicates
that mergers lead to substantial improvement in a fund’s relative internal per-
formance. In the second stage, we estimated a linear regression model in the
same DID framework to examine whether funds in firms affected by mergers
were less likely to experience risk relative to funds in firms unaffected by merg-
ers. One concern with our identification strategy is that treatment and control
groups might differ in a way that correlates with risk or change. We ruled out
this concern by examining whether there were significant differences between
treatment and control groups. Firms involved in mergers and those not involved
in mergers do not differ with respect to risk, change, or fund and firm controls,
with the exception of the control group having higher levels of fund turnover.
Finally, we found that risk or change did not significantly influence the probabil-
ity of mergers.
Results presented in table 6 suggest two important conclusions. First,
model 1 uses internal social performance feedback as the dependent variable.
Results estimated in model 1 show a positive coefficient on the interaction
term betweenMerger and Treatment indicators. This suggests that mergers
act as a positive shock to internal social performance feedback in that funds in
firms that experience mergers, on average, improve their performance relative
to other funds in the same category and in the same firm. Thus mergers
increase a fund’s relative internal positioning. Second, our results are consis-
tent with the main analyses: negative coefficients of Merger× Treatment
reported in models 2, 4, and 6 indicate that an exogenous increase in internal
social performance feedback reduces the propensity to take risk for all of the
three risk-dependent variables. Moreover, models 3, 5, and 7 report the esti-
mates for change. Consistent with our main analyses, the results indicate a
non-significant coefficient of Merger× Treatment. We interpret this finding as
indicating that an exogenous increase in internal performance feedback does
not have an impact on change. We do not report results for our risky change
Table 6. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions of Social Performance Feedback, Risk, and Change
(Mergers)*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable
Internal performance
feedback
Total
risk
Fund
turnover
Non-systematic
risk
Load
change
Systematic
risk
Concentration
change
Mergers ×
Treatment
0.002• −0.104• 0.028 −0.176•• −0.000 −0.012• −0.004
(0.001) (0.053) (0.041) (0.064) (0.000) (0.005) (0.009)
Mergers −0.001 0.022 −0.081•• 0.054 0.000 0.010•• 0.001
(0.001) (0.039) (0.031) (0.049) (0.000) (0.004) (0.007)
Treatment −0.000 0.037 −0.115•• 0.127•• 0.000•• 0.015•• −0.011
(0.001) (0.039) (0.029) (0.046) (0.000) (0.004) (0.007)
Observations 8,769 6,041 6,041 7,682 7,682 7,776 7,776
R-squared 0.476 0.003 0.113 0.002 0.023 0.461 0.020
Log likelihood 21609 −15272 −15272 20775 20775 8671 8671
•
p < .05; ••p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses; all models include control variables, as reported in other models, and month
and category fixed effects.
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dependent variables, which were not significant. Together, these findings pro-
vide additional confidence that internal social performance feedback is causally
related to managerial propensity for risk and that this effect does not arise due
to selection along unobserved traits of managers, with the possible exception
of managerial decisions to engage in risky change.
Robustness checks. We performed several robustness checks. Our theore-
tical argument suggests that low levels of relative performance motivate loss
aversion and problem search, so that performance below aspiration should be
the primary driver of our results. To assess this claim empirically, we created
spline functions for our performance feedback variables, above and below the
social aspiration point, to allow for different slopes for values above and below
aspirations. The results showed coefficients of the spline variables to be nega-
tive and statistically significant for performance below internal aspirations
across all models of risk, one measure of risky change (stock performance),
and two models of change (fund turnover and concentration change). Overall,
our results predicting change were less consistent than those for risk, but they
nevertheless suggested increased change and risk as performance falls relative
to external and internal aspirations, respectively.
Another concern was that our results reflected unobserved heterogeneity at
the firm or fund level. We ruled out this concern by augmenting our specifica-
tion with firm and fund fixed effects (see Online Appendix tables A1 and A2 at
http://asq.sagepub.com/supplemental). The results were generally robust to
the inclusion of these fixed-effects estimators. Internal and external social per-
formance feedback both predicted fund turnover, but the effect of the latter
was greater in magnitude than the effect of the former (table A1; chi-squared =
23.83; p < .01). We further ruled out the possibility that our results reflected
turnover in fund management, if underperforming managers tend to be
replaced by peers with stronger risk-seeking preferences. Though we had no
reason to expect this empirical regularity, we investigated that possibility by
reestimating all models for the subsample of funds that experienced no man-
agerial turnover within a four-month time span following the fund’s underper-
formance. Restricting our sample in this way had no influence on the results. In
additional analyses, we also controlled for change in the models predicting risk,
and vice versa, as an alternative to the SUR regressions to deal with the rela-
tionship between change and risk outcomes—e.g., some risky decisions may
involve change, and some change decisions may involve risk. Our results were
robust to the inclusion of these controls.
Finally, in unreported models, we considered additional tests of the hypothe-
sized individual-level mechanism for risk. The impact of internal social perfor-
mance feedback on risk should be stronger when managers are socially
proximate. We considered two individual attributes, managers’ age and prior
university affiliation, and conducted individual-level analyses. We focused on a
subsample of solo fund managers—approximately 40 percent of the sample—
to enhance statistical precision of social similarity. We used Nelson’s Directory
of Investment Managers and the public search engines ZoomInfo and
Zabasearch to collect data on managers’ age and prior-university-affiliation prox-
imity. We calculated the annual proportion of internal peers in the same age
group as the focal manager and the annual proportion of internal peers who
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obtained a degree from the same university as the focal manager.5 Findings
provided general support for our predictions, indicating that a focal manager
was more likely to seek risk in response to underperformance relative to inter-
nal referents when those referents were similar in age to the focal manager.
We also found partial support for the notion that a focal manager was more
likely to seek risk in response to underperformance relative to internal referents
when those referents shared prior university affiliation with the focal manager.
Finally, the theorized mechanisms received no support in change models: nei-
ther proximity in age nor in prior university affiliation systematically amplified a
manager’s tendency to engage in change in response to either external or inter-
nal social performance feedback.
DISCUSSION
The analyses we present here make a number of contributions. To date,
research has largely considered risk and change as concurrent outcomes asso-
ciated with the same performance feedback antecedents. Our study challenges
this common assumption, suggesting that risk and change tend to arise under
different conditions and are motivated by individual and organizational con-
cerns, respectively. Empirically, we confirmed the well-established notion that
organizational change arises in response to performance shortfalls relative to
external performance aspirations. Moreover, though past studies have often
inferred risk from change alone, our results do not support a relationship
between external social performance feedback and risk. Instead, we found that
decision makers take on greater risk in response to individual concerns, which
become salient when performance falls short of internal social performance
aspirations. Finally, our analyses probed deeper into the instances when risk
and change might overlap; we found that risky change is most likely to occur
as a result of individual concerns triggered by negative internal social compari-
sons and not as a result of organizational problems triggered by negative exter-
nal social comparisons. In fact, we see the highest level of risky change with
unfavorable internal social performance feedback and favorable external social
performance feedback.
By measuring risk directly, we were able to probe for the mechanisms
behind the individual concerns associated with risk. We found that career con-
cerns, as well as social and spatial proximity, account in part for the observed
impact of internal social performance feedback on risk. This finding is concep-
tually consistent with the notion of loss aversion, because those managers
most at risk of termination or loss—those with the most to lose—are also the
most likely to take risks. Importantly, loss aversion operates as an individual
rather than an organizational mechanism predicting risk, and it does not appear
to be isomorphic across all levels of analysis.
Yet more research on risk and individual concerns is needed. We have theo-
rized that individual concerns trigger managerial risk and have focused on those
concerns that arise in response to internal social comparisons. But other com-
parisons may trigger concerns that lead to individual risk. In industries in which
external labor markets are strong and internal comparisons are not salient,
5 Median age was used as a cut-off point to measure age proximity. For robustness, we used ter-
ciles and quartiles as cut-off points and found consistent results.
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decision makers are likely to rely on external comparisons to a greater extent
to assess individual performance. In particular, external social comparisons
may trigger individual concerns and risk in high-level labor markets, such as the
market for CEOs. Consistent with this argument, Burt (1982: 244) suggested
that ‘‘network fear’’ is less relevant in those labor markets in which network
peers are not clear, as with a CEO. Focusing on the market for CEOs is promis-
ing, as there is some research on risk taking and evidence that narcissistic
CEOs may take risky actions because they overestimate their own abilities and
thus underestimate the actual riskiness of a given course of action (Chatterjee
and Hambrick, 2011). Future research could profitably address other sources of
social comparison that are proximate to the decision maker in different ways
and that may trigger different types of risk, as well as the organizational struc-
tures that encourage or discourage internal social comparisons.
In contrast, internal social comparisons may be more prevalent in firms with
franchises, such as banks, and less prevalent in contexts in which inter-unit
comparisons are difficult or discouraged, including unrelated diversified compa-
nies, firms with heterogeneous product divisions (e.g., Tata), or functional orga-
nizations. Our findings may also be less clear when the metrics used for
comparison are more contested and when units propose metrics that reflect
more favorably on themselves, e.g., for self-enhancement (Audia and Brion,
2007; Jordan and Audia, 2012). Finally, other sources of individual concerns
beyond social comparison that trigger risk may be usefully expanded.
Our results also shed light on organizational decision makers’ propensity to
engage in organizational change. Though we confirmed the well-established
argument that poor performance relative to external social performance aspira-
tions predicts change, our findings suggest that the subset of non-risky change
is most likely to be triggered by negative external social performance feedback.
This implies that risky change might be a relatively small subset of the changes
predicted by external social performance feedback. Though it is plausible that
other mechanisms might trigger risky change, our results provide strong sup-
port that problemistic search alone does not suffice; we find that change driven
by problemistic search does not need to imply risk. Future research should
explicitly examine whether biased and local search, which generally start in the
neighborhood of the problem, are less risky (Cyert and March, 1963). These
distinctions should encourage scholars to explicitly measure risky change asso-
ciated with distant search and probe for new mechanisms associated with risky
change (Gavetti, 2012; Winter, 2012).
Our study relates to the behavioral theory notion that organizations are com-
posed of individuals and units (Gavetti, Levinthal, and Ocasio, 2007). We exam-
ine the effects on risk and change in organizations with multiple units, each
with its own distinct and easily comparable performance. Our approach con-
trasts with the literature on performance feedback that has commonly concep-
tualized the organization as a monolithic entity. In fact, although Cyert and
March (1963) noted that the organization comprises subdivisions with different
goals, research has only recently begun to consider multiple performance
benchmarks (Labianca et al., 2009; Giachetti and Lampel, 2010; Gaba and
Joseph, 2013; Moliterno et al., 2014; Joseph and Gaba, 2015). Our research
suggests that different benchmarks may activate different mechanisms and
acknowledges that decisions about risk are motivated by multiple interests and
individual concerns. In short, internal social comparisons across units represent
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an important source of performance feedback that should be more carefully
considered in future research.
Although many unresolved theoretical questions in the performance feed-
back literature concern performance below the aspiration point (e.g., Audia and
Greve, 2006), future research should also give greater consideration to the
effects on risk and change when performance is above the internal and exter-
nal social aspirations. Performance that exceeds external aspirations may trig-
ger a different mechanism than we have discussed here, such as slack search
(Baum et al., 2005), and a different mechanism may be at work when
performance exceeds the internal social aspirations. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that high-performing employees may take oversized risks; traders at
J.P. Morgan and UBS who recently took excessive risks are one example. But
we found no evidence that risk increases for performance above the internal
performance aspirations, and in fact risk taking decreases for total risk and non-
systematic risk. Our findings do not support the idea that high relative internal
social performance leads to more risk, but future research should consider this
question in further detail. And future research can usefully extend Baum et al.
(2005) and further examine the relative impact of different types of inconsistent
feedback (see also Joseph and Gaba, 2015). Our findings for risky change,
when positive external feedback and negative internal feedback together result
in the highest levels of risky change, may suggest the primacy of internal social
performance feedback. This possibility is best examined, however, after recon-
sidering whether the median performance represents an appropriate aspiration
point when assessing the organizational effects of social performance feedback
(see Moliterno et al., 2014).
Finally, and following researchers who have leveraged multilevel theory to
examine and extend core management theories (e.g., Cappelli and Sherer,
1991; Ostroff and Bowen, 2000; Moliterno and Mahony, 2011; Ployhart and
Moliterno, 2011), we see an opportunity to leverage a multilevel framing to
examine the core propositions in the extant research. The behavioral theory of
the firm is an organization-level theory conceptualized to explain organizational
behaviors and phenomena, such as learning, routines, change, and decision
making. But it has long been a premise of organizational scholarship that organi-
zations are multilevel systems (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000; Hitt et al., 2007),
and misspecification ‘‘occurs when we attribute an observed relationship to a
level other than the actual behavioral or responsive unit’’ (Rousseau, 1985: 5).
In this study, we make small but important first steps in exploring this issue in
the context of behavioral theory. Notably, we have argued that organizational
change is driven by organizational problems, whereas risk is driven by individual
concerns. Future conceptual and empirical research should explore more expli-
citly where and how theoretical associations are isomorphic across levels in
behavioral theory and should engage in a full examination of cross-level effects.
For example, threat-rigidity effects are theorized to be isomorphic across the
individual, group, and organizational levels (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton,
1981). Thus, although our efforts here are preliminary, they should be encoura-
ging to scholars who wish to examine behavioral theory in general, and perfor-
mance feedback theory in particular, through a multilevel lens. Scholars might
also consider how individual threat rigidity, triggered by stress, anxiety, and
physiological arousal, and risk, triggered by loss aversion, can be reconciled.
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Methodologically, the mutual fund setting offered key advantages with
respect to examining risk. Our definition of risk—variation in the distribution of
possible outcomes—does not differentiate between managerial perceptions of
uncertainty and the actual actions that increase uncertainty. The finance setting
offers the advantage of quantifying risk more precisely because ex ante estima-
tions of risk are widely known. As a result, our study is better able to separate
risk taking from change and to investigate their respective drivers. Though our
focus was on financial risk, it generalizes beyond the finance context to other
types of risk, such as strategic or operational risk. But our findings may be less
applicable to contexts in which decision makers are unable to estimate risk ex
ante. In those contexts, actual risk is more likely to be an incidental rather than
an intended consequence of managers’ decisions. Our theorizing suggests that
individual concerns may trigger actions that are perceived to be risky, even if
ex post it is clear that the action did not result in variability in outcomes.
Additional research on the relationship between perceived and actual risk is
warranted to identify individual concerns.
This study revisits the common assumption that organizational change
necessarily involves greater risk, and we demonstrate different antecedents to
risk and change outcomes. We find that risk often arises when decision makers
have individual concerns that trigger loss aversion, in this case caused by unfa-
vorable internal social performance comparisons. This mechanism is distinct
from problemistic search, an organizational mechanism typically linked to unfa-
vorable external social performance comparisons. Together, these insights indi-
cate that although the broader environment is important to understanding
decision making, so too are the internal dynamics of a firm.
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